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NOTES
THE EFFECT OF STRIKES UPON VACATIONS
Paid vacations are not a legal requirement in the United States
but rather contractual rights established through collective bargaining.1
Although vacations constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining,2
vacation rights are rarely absolute or unconditional. Almost all plans,
however structured, require a minimum amount of work for vacation
eligibility.3 The minimum service requirement is usually expressed
either in terms of continuous service or as a specified amount of time
worked during the qualifying year,4 and additional units of paid vaca-
tion are commonly granted to workers with longer periods of service.5
Eligibility clauses often stipulate that certain absences, such as those
owing to layoffs, injuries, and illnesses, will be counted as days worked 6
and not as breaks in continuous service.7 Employee strike absences are
analogous to absences owing to layoffs and illnesses-although strikers
are not actively working during the strike period, they retain their
status as employees.8 Nevertheless, labor and management rarely con-
1 Evening News Ass'n, 185 N.L.R.B. No. 70, at 8, 76 L.R.R.M. 130 (Sept. 4, 1970)
(trial examiner's decision).
2 See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Copper Prods. Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 860, 369 (1952).
8 CCH UNION CONiRACr CLAUsEs 51,202, at 200 (1954). A common form of vacation
eligibility clause provides that after an employee has worked one year, he earns the right
to a paid vacation of specified length. See, e.g., Brymnore Press, Inc., 8 Lab. Arb. 511, 514
(1947) (Rains, Arbitrator). For example, the eligibility requirement may be expressed as
"(1) continuity in the service of the employer during the qualifying year; and (2) at
least 1900 hours of working time during the year." Hess-Dubois Cleaners, 19 Lab. Arb.
200, 202 (1952) (Allen, Arbitrator). Other vacation plans grant credits as a percentage
of wages and thus have a built-in work requirement. If the employee does not work he
receives no credits. E.g., Tex Tan Welhausen Co., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 98, 70 L.R.R.M.
1206 (July 4, 1968), enforced, 419 F.2d 1265 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated and remanded on
other grounds per curiam, 897 U.S. 819, modified on other grounds, 434 F.2d 405 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 US. 978 (1971).
4 E.g., Hess-Dubois Cleaners, 19 Lab. Arb. 200, 202 (1952).
G CCH UNION CoNmAcr CLAusEs 51,201, at 195 (1954). For example, an employee
with one or more years of service receives two weeks vacation; with five or more years
of service, three weeks vacation; and with 20 or more years of service, four weeks vaca-
tion. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 1 (1964) (Turkus, Arbitrator).
6 Typically, such clauses specify a maximum amount of absences beyond which de-
ductions are made. See, e.g., Richland Shale Brick Co., 49 Lab. Arb. 113, 114 (1966) (Sein-
sheimer, Arbitrator).
7 See, e.g., Barrett Transp., Inc., 52 Lab. Arb. 169, 171 (1969) (Koven, Arbitrator).
8 Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act provides: "The term, employee,
... shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in con-
nection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and
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sider strike absences when setting forth vacation eligibility require-
ments. 9
Vacation eligibility problems that arise after strikes concern
(1) whether vacation credits' 0 can be denied for the period of the strike,
(2) whether the strike will affect the computation of an employee's
overall length of service, and (3) whether an eligibility date falling
within the strike period will affect an employee's vacation benefits.
Although vacation eligibility is determined by the intentions of the
contracting parties, these problems are not solely within the domain of
the arbitrator. The National Labor Relations Board is empowered to
remedy employer conduct that discriminates against employees for
engaging in concerted activity protected by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA)." When the employer relies on contract language
to justify a denial or proration of strikers' vacation benefits, the Board,
much like the arbitrator, is presented in part with an issue of vacation
eligibility. When the employer does not rely on contract language
to justify denial of vacation benefits, however, the Board may still
examine his conduct in terms of possible unfair labor practices.
I
DENIAL OF ACCRUED VACATION BENEFITS TO STRIKERS
In the landmark case of NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.,'2 the
employer admitted that the strikers had fulfilled vacation eligibility
who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment...."
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
9 Evening News Ass'n, 53 Lab. Arb. 170, 176 (1969) (Casselman, Arbitrator); Daykin,
Vacation Rights Under Collective Bargaining Agreements, 17 ARm. J. (ns.) 34, 35 (1962).
10 The term "vacation credits" is used to describe a worker's credits earned towards
satisfying current eligibility requirements. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
11 The right to strike is protected by sections 7 and 13 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 157, 163 (1970). Section 7 provides: "Employees shall have the right .. .to engage in
...concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection .... " Id. § 157. Section 13 provides: "Nothing in this subchapter, except as
specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or im-
pede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifica-
tions on that right." Id. § 163.
The Board's jurisdiction under sections 10(a) and (b) of the Act (29 US.C. §§ 160(a),
(b) (1970)) is not based on the contractual rights of the parties but on the filing of unfair
labor practice charges under sections 8(a)(3) and (1) (29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3), (1) (1970)),
alleging (1) employer discrimination in regard to a term or condition of employment to
discourage union membership and (2) interference with, restraint, or coercion of em-
ployees in the exercise of their right to strike. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.,
388 U.S. 26, 31 n.7 (1967); Star Expansion Indus. Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 563, 567 n.12 (1967),
petition for review denied sub nom. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 409
F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
12 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
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requirements, but withheld vacation pay from them while granting it
to both non-strikers and those strikers who had abandoned the work
stoppage. 13 The Board held that denial of vacation pay to those em-
ployees who had not abandoned the strike constituted unlawful dis-
crimination in violation of sections 8(a)(3) and (1) of the NLRA. 14
The Fifth Circuit denied enforcement on the ground that there was
insufficient evidence to support the Board's finding of unlawful moti-
vation.15
Upholding the Board's order, the Supreme Court distinguished
discriminatory employer conduct which is "inherently destructive" of
employee rights from that which has only a "comparatively slight" ef-
fect on employee rights.' 6 If the challenged employer conduct falls
into either category-if it is discriminatory conduct that has some ad-
verse effect on employee rights--the employer must establish that he
was prompted by substantial and legitimate business justifications.'7
If the employer fails to meet this burden of explanation, he has violated
section 8(a)(3) regardless of the category into which his conduct falls.' 8
Moreover, even if an employer comes forward with substantial and
legitimate business justifications for conduct which is inherently de-
structive of employee rights, the Board, in an effort to strike a balance
between the asserted business justifications and the invasion of em-
ployee rights, may find an 8(a)(3) violation by drawing an inference of
improper motive.' 9 But if the employer advances substantial and legiti-
mate business reasons for conduct with a comparatively slight effect
13 It was the contention of the employer that its obligation to pay vacation benefits
terminated with the expiration of the contract and that its paying of vacation benefits
to non-strikers was based on the adoption of a unilateral policy to pay vacation benefits
to all employees who were at work on July 1, 1963, a date which coincided with the
vacation eligibility date of the expired contract. 150 N.L.R.B. 438, 443 (1964), enforcement
denied, 363 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
14 Id. at 438. Section 8(a)(3) states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or con-
dition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization
... ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). Discouraging membership in a labor organization has
often been held to include discouraging participation in a strike. See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233 (1963). Section 8(a)(1) provides: "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7] . 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970). See also
note 11 supra.
15 Great Dane Trailers, Inc. v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 130, 134-35 (5th Cir. 1966).
16 NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1967).
1'7 Id. at 34.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 33-34.
1972]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
on employee rights, anti-union motivation must be proved to sustain
an 8(a)(8) charge.20
In reinstating the Board's finding of an 8(a)(3) violation, the Court
did not decide whether the withholding of accrued vacation pay from
strikers constituted discriminatory conduct inherently destructive of
employee rights or conduct with a comparatively slight effect on em-
ployee rights.21 The employer's discriminatory conduct was held to be
violative of section 8(a)(3) because it had at least some adverse effect
on employee rights and the employer did not meet his burden of proof
by presenting substantial and legitimate business justifications for his
conduct.22 Thus neither the Board nor the courts have decided into
which category of discriminatory conduct the withholding of strikers'
accrued vacation benefits falls.23 However, the Board has consistently
held in cases similar to Great Dane that where the employer fails to give
sufficient business justifications for his conduct, the denial to strikers of
vacation-ben-fits earned before the strikci& v -la'ti f sections 8(a)(3)
and (1).24 It would seem difficult, if not impossible, for an employer
to advance substantial and legitimate business justification for with-
holding accrued vacation pay from strikers. 25
20 Id. at 34.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 34-35.
23 Under the Great Dane rationale it is not necessary to decide which category dis-
criminatory conduct with an adverse effect on employee rights fits into until after the
employer has advanced substantial and legitimate business justifications for his conduct.
388 U.S. at 34-35. Although the Seventh Circuit in dictum has stated that denial of ac-
crued vacation benefits to strikers constitutes inherently destructive conduct, the cases
cited do not support this conclusion. System Council T-4 v. NLRB, 446 F.2d 815, 819
(7th Cir. 1971).
24 Cavalier Div., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 77 L.R.R.M. 1889 (Aug. 4, 1971); McCann
Steel Co., 191 N.L.R.B. No. 64, 77 L.R.R.M. 1783 (June 23, 1971); Star Expansion Indus.
Corp., 164 N.L.1.B. 563 (1967), petition for review denied sub nom. United Elec., Radio
& Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Hoffman Beverage Co., 163
N.L.B. 981 (1967); Jaycox Sanitary Serv., Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 544 (1966); MacMillan Ring-
Free Oil Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 877 (1966), enforcement granted in part on other grounds, 394
F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 914 (1969). The Board has also held, how-
ever, that an employer did not commit an unfair labor practice by granting vacations
to non-strikers who did not qualify under the collective bargaining agreement while also
granting vacation benefits to strikers, including one who did not qualify. Sinclair Glass
Co., 188 N.L.R.B. No. 33, 76 L.R.R.M. 1289 (Feb. 10, 1971).
25 See, e.g., Star Expansion Indus. Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 563 (1967), petition for review
denied sub nom. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
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II
ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
A. Denial of Vacation Credit for the Period of the Strike
Prior to Great Dane, the Board had held in General Electric Co.26
that an employer's denial of vacation credits27 to economic strikers for
the period of the strike did not constitute a violation of sections 8(a)(3)
and (1) even if the employer granted the credits to non-strikers who
performed no actual work during the strike period.28 The Board rea-
soned that deferred benefits such as paid vacations are actually a form
of wages and stated, "It is axiomatic that the Respondent is not re-
quired under the Act to finance an economic strike against [Respondent]
by remunerating the strikers for work not performed." 29 Therefore,
no discriminatory conduct resulted from granting vacation credit
to the non-working non-strikers. The Board found that non-strikers
could be legally compensated for their employment in a standby capac-
ity because they made their services available during the strike and
were subject to the employer's call.30 The same result was reached by
the Board in Mooney Aircraft, Inc.,3 1 a pre-Great Dane case involving
an unfair labor practice strike. In Mooney Aircraft nine unfair labor
26 80 N.L.R.B. 510 (1948).
27 See note 10 supra.
28 In his dissent, Board member Murdock stated that the majority's holding could
not be reconciled with Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 820 (Sd Cir.), cert. denied,
909 U.S. 684 (1940). 80 N.L.R.B. at 514 n.13 (dissenting opinion). Enforcing a Board
order requiring reinstatement of unfair labor practice strikers "without prejudice to
their seniority or other rights or privileges," the Third Circuit in Republic Steel held
that the intendment of the order was that the continuous service of strikers should be
computed as if they had actually worked during the strike period. 114 F.2d at 821. The
court, however, did not actually award vacation credit for the period of the strike, be-
cause the Board's order required neither back pay of wages nor vacation pay for the
strike period. What the court did hold was that the Board's order required that the
unfair labor practice strike not be considered to constitute a break in a striker's overall
length of service, the criterion determining the length of an employee's vacation. This
is quite different from the Board's holding in General Electric that an employer does
not have to grant vacation credit to economic strikers for the period of the strike. Re-
public Steel is also of limited precedential value since, as the Board noted, the Third
Circuit was merely upholding the Board's discretionary power to remedy unfair labor
practices. 80 N.L.R.B. at 512 n.5.
29 80 N.L.R.B. at 511.
30 Id. at 512, citing Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946). As a matter
of federal labor law policy, the Board stated that "an employer whose operations are
strike-bound should be permitted to compensate non-strikers for their involuntary loss
of time for the purpose of holding intact that portion of his working force." 80 N.L.R.B.
at 512.
31 148 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1964), enforced, 366 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1966).
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practice strikers were denied all vacation benefits for a particular year
because deduction of the time spent on strike resulted in their failure
to fulfill the vacation eligibility requirement of one year's work. 2
Relying upon General Electric and noting that unfair labor practice
strikers are not awarded back pay for the period of the strike, the
Board held that no violation of sections 8(a)(3) and (1) had been
committed.33
Unions have contended that General Electric and Mooney Air-
craft were overruled sub silentio by the Supreme Court's decision in
Great Dane;84 the Board, however, has disagreed, holding with only
a few exceptions that an employer is not required by law to treat strike
time as time worked for the purpose of vacation eligibility. 5 The
Board's Great Dane decision, which was adopted and amplified by the
32 Id. at 1059.
33 Id.
34 See System Council T-4 v. NLRB, 446 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1971), enforcing Illinois
Bell Tel. Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 681 (1969); Kimberly-Clark Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 69
L.R.R.M. 1408 (May 24, 1968).
35 Roegelein Provision Co., 181 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 73 L.R.R.M. 1396 (March 11, 1970);
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 681 (1969), enforced sub nom. System Council T-4 v.
NLRB, 446 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1971); Kimberly-Clark Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 69
L.R.R.M. 1408 (May 24, 1968); but see Tex Tan Welhausen Co., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 93,
70 L.R.R.M. 1206 (July 4, 1968), enforced, 419 F.2d 1265 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated and re-
manded on other grounds per curiam, 397 U.S. 819, modified on other grounds, 434 F.2d
405 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971).
In Tex Tan the contractual vacation plan established vacation pay as a percentaje
of yearly salary and provided that all vacation pay would be forfeited for absences in
excess of 280 hours during the qualifying year. The employer deducted time spent on
an unfair labor practice strike in calculating absence. As a result, all of the strikers ex-
ceeded the minimum absence allowance and were denied vacation pay. 419 F.2d at 1271.
Approving the Board's finding of a violation of sections 8(a)(3) and (1), the Fifth Circuit
noted that unfair labor practice strikers deserve special protection and that the vacation
plan automatically adjusted for strike time by basing benefits on a percentage of wages.
Id. at 1271-72. Except for the built-in adjustment for non-working time in the vacation
plan, this decision is inconsistent with other cases decided by the Board. In Mooney
Aircraft, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1964), enforced, 366 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1966), the unfair
labor practice strikers were not placed in an especially protected category. See text ac-
companying notes 31-33 supra. Moreover, the Board has held that an employer does not
commit an unfair labor practice when he denies vacation benefits to strikers who have
exceeded a contractual minimum absence allowance because of time spent on strike.
Roegelein Provision Co., 181 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 73 L.R.R.M. 1396 (March 11, 1970).
In Hanley Dawson Chevrolet, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 944 (1967), the employer denied
vacation benefits to employees who failed to fulfill the one-year employment eligibility
requirement as a result of participating in a two-month strike. Adopting the trial ex-
aminer's decision, the Board found a violation of sections 8(a)(3) and (I). Id. at 950. This
case is squarely in conflict with Mooney Aircraft and Roegelein Provision. The Board's
holding is the result of reliance on Quality Castings Co., 139 N.L.R1B. 928 (1962), en-
forcement denied, 325 F.2d 36 (6th Cir. 1963), a case reversed in part by the Sixth Circuit
and of doubtful validity today. Note 67 infra.
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Supreme Court, specifically distinguished General Electric by noting
that the Board was not awarding vacation pay to strikers for any period
of the strike, but was simply requiring that the same eligibility stan-
dards be adopted and enforced with regard to strikers and non-
strikers.386 Although General Electric involved denial, for the period
of the strike, of eligibility credit for future vacation benefits, Great
Dane was concerned with the withholding of accrued benefits in the
face of conceded eligibility.
Subsequent to Great Dane, Board holdings that an employer is
not required to grant vacation eligibility credit for the period of the
strike have followed one of two approaches. One rationale holds that
General Electric established that denial of vacation credit for the strike
period is not discriminatory conduct and that the Great Dane princi-
ples cannot be invoked to impose a burden of explanation on the em-
ployer until his conduct has been shown by extrinsic evidence to be
discriminatory.37 Unfortunately, the issue is not so easily resolved.
Denial of vacation credit for the period of the strike is clearly dis-
criminatory conduct which has some adverse effect on employee rights;
employees are discouraged from striking when forfeiture of vacation
rights may result from failure to meet the minimum work require-
ments. The second rationale used by the Board is that although denial
of vacation credit for the strike period is discriminatory conduct, it can
usually be supported by substantial and legitimate business justifi-
cations.38 This rationale conforms to reality and removes any doubt
about the continuing validity of General Electric by applying the
Great Dane principles to General Electric-type employer conduct.8 9
36 150 N.L.R.B. 438, 439 n-2 (1964).
37 See, e.g., Kimberly-Clark Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 82, at 13, 69 L.R.R.M. 1408
(May 24, 1968) (trial examiner's decision). Relying upon NIRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co.,
389 US. 375 (1967), the Third Circuit has specifically rejected the argument that the
Great Dane principles can be applied only after discriminatory conduct has been proven.
NLRB v. Frick Co., 397 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1968), enforcing in part 161 N.L.R.B. 1089
(1966). In Fleetwood Trailer, the Supreme Court applied the Great Dane principles to
an employer's refusal to reinstate strikers without first deciding whether the employer's
conduct was discriminatory. The Court reasoned that refusal to reinstate strikers "is
clearly no less destructive of important employee rights than a refusal to make vacation
payments." 389 U.S. at 880. In the Frick case, the Third Circuit held that refusal to pay
vacation benefits to strikers constitutes evidence of sufficient discrimination to require
proof of substantial and legitimate business justifications. 897 F.2d at 962.
38 E.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 681, 685 (1969), enforced sub noma.
System Council T-4 v. NLRB, 446 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1971). See text accompanying note
29 supra.
39 More accurately, by a priori striking the balance in favor of business justifications,
the Board effectively relieves the employer of much of his burden of asserting business
justifications under Great Dane principles. While one might still contest the propriety
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Most arbitrators have ruled that when a collective bargaining
agreement contains any kind of minimum work requirement for vaca-
tion eligibility, vacation credits do not accrue during the strike period.40
Much of the arbitrators' reasoning resembles that of the Board. Thus
arbitrators have determined that a paid vacation is in the nature of
deferred earnings and, like wages, vacation credits accumulate only
when work is performed.41 Although arbitrators' awards are based on
of the Board's balancing, its authority to do so is unquestionable. See text accompanying
note 18 supra. However, denial of vacation credit for the strike period would violate
sections 8(a)(3) and (1) if the union could prove anti-union motivation.
40 Folding Carrier Corp., 53 Lab. Arb. 784 (1969) (Gorsuch, Arbitrator) (employer
may deny service credit for period of strike); Evening News Ass'n, 53 Lab. Arb.
170 (1969) (Casselman, Arbitrator) (employer able to prorate vacations by withholding
credit for period of strike when collective bargaining agreement required "regular full
time employees" to complete various periods of continuous service to be eligible for vaca-
tions of differing lengths); Northwest Airlines, Inc., 49 Lab. Arb. 1182 (1967) (Wolf, Ar-
bitrator) (strikers not entitled to vacation credit for any part of strike under vacation
clause allowing credit to accrue during first 30 days of absence even though contract pro-
vided that continuous service would not be broken by strike); Union Carbide Corp.,
49 Lab. Arb. 1180 (1967) (Cahn, Arbitrator) (strikers not entitled to vacation pay because
they did not fulfill time worked requirement of contract even though strike settlement
agreement waived loss of seniority and company service credit for strike period); Motor
Car Dealers Ass'n, 49 Lab. Arb. 55 (1967) (Beatty, Arbitrator) (under contract granting
vacation credit for excused absences, strike time does not constitute excused absence);
Richland Shale Brick Co., 49 Lab. Arb. 113 (1966) (Seinsheimer, Arbitrator) (employer
entitled to deduct 1/52 of vacation pay for each week of strike under contract clause
providing that after two-week allowance, 1/52 of vacation pay will be deducted for each
week of absence or layoff); Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 1 (1964) (Turkus,
Arbitrator) (employer entitled to deduct time spent on strike for determining how much
vacation, if any, employee entitled to under contract basing vacation eligibility on years
of service); Modecraft Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 1236 (1961) (DalI, Arbitrator) (employer able to
deduct strike time in determining vacation pay under contract specifically basing vacation
eligibility on "time worked"); San Bruno Sportservice, Inc., 33 Lab. Arb. 837 (1959) (Ross,
Arbitrator) (strike absences caused strikers not to qualify for vacation pay because they
did not fulfill eligibility requirement of being in employ of employer for 75% of
racetrack meeting); Vickers, Inc., 27 Lab. Arb. 251 (1956) (Smith, Arbitrator) (under con-
tract providing that vacation pay credits accumulate at stipulated rate per month.
employer can deny vacation credits for time spent on strike); United States Steel Co., 18
Lab. Arb. 519 (1952) (Blair, Arbitrator) (failure to fulfill eligibility requirement of re-
ceiving earnings in at least 60% of pay periods during qualifying year rendered strikers
not qualified for paid vacation); St. Louis Car Co., 5 ab. Arb. 572 (1946) (Wardlaw,
Arbitrator) (although contract provided that time spent on layoff is counted as time
worked for vacation eligibility, strike time held not to be time worked).
41 E.g., Evening News Ass'n, 53 Lab. Arb. 170, 175 (1969) (Casselman, Arbitrator);
Union Carbide Corp., 49 Lab. Arb. 1180, 1181 (1967) (Cahn, Arbitrator); San Bruno
Sportservice, Inc., 33 Lab. Arb. 837, 839-40 (1959) (Ross, Arbitrator). The theory that
vacations are a gratuity from the employer to provide rest and therefore to improve
employee efficiency is no longer popular. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp., 49 ab. Arb. 1180,
1181; San Bruno Sportservice, Inc., 33 ab. Arb. 837, 839-40; cf. Mallet & Co., 34 Lab. Arb.
428 (1960) (Wood, Arbitrator); D. ALLEN, FRINGE BEmrrs: WAGES OR SOCIAL OBLIGATION?
(1964).
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their interpretation of the contract and the intention of the parties,
public policy is sometimes relied upon to interpret ambiguous contract
provisions.42 Some awards thus reflect a view that, since a strike consti-
tutes the mutual withdrawal of services and compensation,43 an em-
ployer required to count strike time as time worked for purposes of
vacation eligibility would in effect be required to subsidize a strike
against himself.44 Therefore, before they will make such an award,
most arbitrators have required specific contract language providing that
vacation credits accrue for the strike period. One arbitrator even ex-
pressed his surprise that such a vacation grievance was filed and stated
that "by no stretch of the imagination can I be persuaded that a strike
... can be considered other than time off from work ....
Some arbitrators' imaginations can apparently be stretched since
a small number have allowed strike time to be treated as time worked
for the purpose of vacation eligibility.46 A few of these awards are well
reasoned, relying heavily upon the past practice of the parties and the
circumstances surrounding the strike, such as a company policy state-
42 I must conclude that the agreement did not provide vacation credit during
a strike. This conclusion is supported by sound public policy and labor relations
practice. The purpose of the strike is to test in the crucible of deprivation
whether the positions of either side will be changed. If strikes have any validity
in our society, it is that they demonstrate that the members of the union are so
convinced that their position is correct that they are willing to forego all the
economic benefits of their employment in order to demonstrate their sincerity
and the employer is willing to forego all economic benefits it may enjoy from
their employment. It would be anomalous indeed if the employees were to retain
some of their collective [sic] bargained benefits while they fully deprive the em-
ployer of the fruits of operating its business.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 49 Lab. Arb. 1182, 1185-86 (1967) (Wolf, Arbitrator).
43 Evening News Ass'n, 53 Lab. Arb. 170, 175-76 (1969) (Casselman, Arbitrator).
44 Folding Carrier Corp., 53 Lab. Ab. 784, 791 (1969) (Gorsuch, Arbitrator); Motor
Car Dealers Ass'n, 49 Lab. Arb. 55, 56 (1967) (Beatty, Arbitrator); ef. text accompanying
note 29 supra.
Although strikers retain their status as employees under Section 2(3) of the NLRA
(29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970)), it has been noted that retention of employee status during
a strike connotes a bare employment relationship and vacation credits accumulate only
when active work is performed. San Bruno Sportservice, Inc., 33 Lab. Arb. 837, 838-40
(1959) (Ross, Arbitrator). The employment status of strikers has been analogized to that
of employees on medical leaves of absence. An employee on medical leave of absence also
maintains his employee status but is rarely entitled to vacation pay based on his time
away from work. Id. at 839-40.
45 Richland Shale Brick Co., 49 Lab. Arb. 113, 117 (1966) (Seinsheimer, Arbitrator).
46 Detroit Free Press, 52 Lab. Arb. 1134 (1969) (Alexander, Arbitrator); Barrett
Transp., Inc., 52 ab. Arb. 169 (1969) (Koven, Arbitrator); Mobil Oil Co., 42 ab. Arb.
102 (1963) (Forsythe, Arbitrator), rev'd sub noma., Local 7-644, Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers
Union v. Mobil Oil Co., No. 64-44 (E.D. Il. Oct. 26, 1964), rev'd and enforced, 350 F.2d 708
(7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966); Hydraulic Press Mfg. Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 689
(1963) (Dworkin, Arbitrator); Ford Motor Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 638 (1959) (Platt, Arbitrator);
Hess-Dubois Cleaners, 19 Lab. Arb. 200 (1952) (Allen, Arbitrator).
1972]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ment to preserve the status quo.47 On the other hand, one award was
based on the notion that vacation credit must be granted for the
period of the strike because the parties did not provide otherwise in
their collective bargaining agreement.48 Since labor and management
rarely deal with strikes when setting forth vacation eligibility pro-
visions,4 9 and because the thrust of other decisions and awards is
towards denial of vacation credit, this argument is not persuasive.
In Hess-Dubois Cleaners50 the arbitrator determined that by waiv-
ing a continuous service eligibility requirement the parties intended
to waive a time worked requirement as well.51 Yet, if the parties had
intended to have vacation credits accrue for the period of the strike, it
would not have been necessary to provide that the strike would not
break continuity of service.5 2 At the time of negotiating the contract,
the parties were, or should have been, aware that two separate require-
ments existed for vacation eligibility and that waiving the continuous
service requirement would not logically waive the time worked re-
quirement.
B. Effect of a Strike upon Overall Length of Service
Two periods of time have to be accounted for in most vacation
systems: (1) the employee's overall length of service, to determine his
basic entitlement to a vacation of specified length, and (2) the working
time an employee has accumulated in the qualifying year to determine
47 E.g., Ford Motor Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 688 (1959) (Platt, Arbitrator). In Mobil Oil Co.,
42 Lab. Arb. 102 (1963) (Forsythe, Arbitrator), the use of the words "active service" in the
vacation eligibility provision indicated that vacation credits would accrue only for the
actual performance of work; but the arbitrator held that since the employer did not pro-
rate for the part of the strike that occurred during the prior eligibility year, he could
not do so for the succeeding year. In Detroit Free Press, 52 Lab. Arb. 1134 (1969) (Alex-
ander, Arbitrator), the arbitrator relied on the employer's past practice of granting va-
cation credit for a strike period; he also stressed, however, that the contract provided
for proration of vacation benefits for leaves of absence but did not mention strikes. See
text accompanying note 49 infra. The arbitrator in Barrett Transp., Inc., 52 Lab. Arb.
169 (1969) (Koven, Arbitrator), relied on the lack of contractual authorization to deny
credit for the strike period; but his award was supported by a strike settlement agree-
ment that provided for retroactivity of the terms of the new agreement to a date prior
to the beginning of the strike.
48 Hydraulic Press Mfg. Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 689 (1963) (Dworkin, Arbitrator).
49 Text accompanying note 9 supra.
50 19 Lab. Arb. 200 (1952) (Allen, Arbitrator).
51 Id. at 208.
52 In deciding that the collective bargaining agreement did not provide for accrual
of vacation credit during the strike period despite the existence of a contractual stipula-
tion that continuous service would not be broken by a strike, the arbitrator in Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 49 Lab. Arb. 1182, 1185 (1967) (Wolf, Arbitrator), reached a conclusion
contrary to Hess-Dubos.
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if he is eligible to enjoy his basic entitlement. As with withdrawal of
a reinstated striker's job seniority,5 3 an employer would be hard-pressed
to advance substantial and legitimate business reasons for depriving
strikers of accrued overall length of service for vacation purposes.54
A more difficult question is whether strike time must be added
to an employee's overall length of service in computing basic entitle-
ment. In setting forth overall length of service provisions, labor and
management variously use words such as "continuous service," "con-
tinuous employment," "service," and "seniority." 55 This terminology
is imprecise and can lead to confusion. For example, while the Board
decided in General Electric that refusal to grant vacation credit for
the strike period did not constitute an unfair labor practice, it also held
that "tolling the seniority of the strikers during their participation in
the strike, and at the same time permitting other employees to accrue
seniority" did violate sections 8(a)(3) and (1).56 The Board reasoned
that, unlike vacation credits which constitute compensation for work
performed, relative job seniority affects tenure of employment, and the
employment relationship of a reinstated striker cannot be impaired be-
cause he engaged in protected concerted activity.57
Job seniority, however, is a concept entirely different from length
of service for vacation purposes. 8 An employer should not be required
53 See, e.g., NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967); NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); C.H. Guenther & Son, Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. No. 174,
70 L.R.R.M. 1433 (March 18, 1969), enforced, 427 F.2d 983 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 942 (1970); Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 175, 68 L.R.R.M. 1252 (June 19, 1968),
enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1969); California Date Growers
Ass'n, 118 N.L.R.B. 246 (1957), modified and enforced, 259 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1958); Olin
Mathieson Chem. Corp., 114 N.L.R.B. 486 (1955), enforced, 232 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1956),
aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 1020 (1957). A similar problem was presented in NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963), when the Supreme Court upheld the Board's finding
that granting superseniority to non-strikers and strike replacements is conduct that is
inherently destructive of employee rights and thus violalve of sections 8(a)(3) and (1).
54 Overall length of service earned prior to the work stoppage is as much an earned
right as "job seniority" and accrued vacation pay or credits. See text accompanying notes
21-25 supra.
55 The parties frequently use the same words when setting forth the minimum work
requirement, which causes confusion in differentiating the two distinct requirements of
minimum work and overall length of service. See note 62 infra.
56 80 N.L.R.B. at 512.
57 Id. at 513.
58 As admitted by both the Union and the Respondent..., continuous service
credit did not itself constitute compensation. Nor was it per se a condition of
employment. It was simply a basis for the determination of certain real benefits,
such as [job] seniority, vacations, and pensions .... It follows that the legality
of the various effects of Respondent's action upon the conditions and tenure of
employment of its employees must be considered separately.
Id. at 511 (footnote omitted).
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by law to count strike time in determining an employee's basic vaca-
tion entitlement- "vacation seniority." The right to a certain vacation
length, like vacation credits for minimum work requirements, con-
stitutes deferred earnings for work performed. Although additional
entitlement is admittedly based upon greater length of service, at this
point similarity ends between "seniority" for vacation purposes and
"seniority" as used by the Board in General Electric. Job seniority
affects the position of one employee vis-h-vis his fellow employees in
regard to such matters as relative status for layoffs. When used to
determine eligibility for additional units of paid vacation, "seniority"
affects the employer-employee relationship rather than the relative
status of employees, and therefore does not relate to tenure of em-
ployment.59
One arbitrator has specifically dealt with the effect of a strike upon
vacation "seniority."60 As a matter of federal labor law, rather than
contract interpretation, the arbitrator decided that the employer could
not withdraw the "seniority" that strikers had accrued prior to the
work stoppage and therefore could not treat the strike as a break in
continuity of employment and the reinstated strikers as new em-
ployees. 61 He also held, however, that strike time should not be counted
towards vacation "seniority," because to do so would be unfair to those
employees who did not strike and would cause the employer to subsi-
dize a strike against himself.62
59 If seniority is used to determine employee choice of vacation time, however, it
would affect employee interrelationships. The Board has held that a contract clause that
gave strike replacements and employees who abandoned the strike superseniority with
respect to choice of vacation times violated sections 8(a)(3) and (I). Great Lakes Carbon
Corp., 152 N.L.R.B. 988 (1965), petition to set aside order denied, 360 F.2d 19 (4th Cir.
1966).
60 Folding Carrier Corp., 53 Lab. Arb. 784 (1969) (Gorsuch, Arbitrator).
61 53 Lab. Arb. at 790, 792.
62 Id. at 791. Arbitrators have uniformly determined that strikes do not cause a loss
of length of service accrued prior to the work stoppage. E.g., Folding Carrier Corp., 53
Lab. Arb. 784 (1969) (Gorsuch, Arbitrator); Marathon Rubber Prods. Co., 6 Lab. Arb.
238 (1947) (Gilden, Arbitrator); Greyhound Bus Co., I Lab. Arb. 596 (1946) (Simkin, Ar-
bitrator). Some cases, however, are misleading. Although the arbitrators state that the
strike resulted in a break in continuous service, they actually mean that vacation
credits do not accrue for the period of the strike. Vindicator Printing Co., 48 Lab. Arb.
213 (1966) (Smith, Arbitrator); Denver Upholstered Furniture Mfrs., 42 Lab. Arb. 929
(1964) (Seligson, Arbitrator); Stearms Coal & Lumber Co., I Lab. Arb. 274 (1946) (Dwyer,
Arbitrator). The confusion is attributable to the frequent use of the words "continuous
service" by labor and management when setting forth both the overall length of service
and minimum working time requirements. See note 55 supra.
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C. Effect of Vacation Eligibility Date Falling Within the Strike Period
Many vacation eligibility clauses stipulate a cutoff date for deter-
mining overall length of service and amount of working time in the
current year.63 It is also common for vacation eligibility dates to be
established by provisions requiring employees to be listed on the pay-
roll or in the continuous employ of the employer on a certain date to
qualify for vacation benefits. 64 The Board has consistently rejected
employer attempts to deny earned vacation benefits to strikers on the
ground that they failed to be at work on the vacation eligibility date.
However, of the two approaches the Board has used to reach this result,
only one is reconcilable with the prevalent deferred compensation-
earned benefit rationale underlying other vacation eligibility decisions.
In 1966 the Board, in Frick Co.,65 adopted a trial examiner's rec-
ommended order holding that an employer's denial of vacation ben-
efits based on strikers' absences on the eligibility date was violative
of sections 8(a)(3) and (1) because the employer had equated strike
time with unexcused absence.66 This rationale dearly conflicts with
63 E.g., Brymnore Press, Inc., 8 Lab. Arb. 511, 514 (1947) (Rains, Arbitrator). This
date is commonly referred to as the "vacation eligibility date," "vacation qualifying date,"
or "vacation anniversary date."
64 E.g., Smith v. Kingsport Press, Inc., 366 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'g 233 F. Supp.
643 (E.D. Tenn. 1964); Duncan Foundry & Mach. Works, Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 71
L.R.R.M. 1225 (June 5, 1969), enforced, 435 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1970).
65 161 N.L.R.B. 1089 (1966), enforced in part, 397 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1968).
66 The trial examiner found a violation of sections 8(a)(3) and (1) on the alternative
grounds that the employer had either equated strike time with an unexcused absence or
had demonstrated anti-union motivation. Id. at 1108. The court enforced the Board's
order on the grounds that the employer's conduct presented sufficient evidence of dis-
crimination to invoke the Great Dane principles and that the employer failed to advance
substantial and legitimate business justifications.
The Board's holding in Frick was based on its earlier decision in Quality Castings
Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 928 (1962), enforcement denied, 325 F.2d 36 (6th Cir. 1963), that al-
though an employer cannot be required to make profit sharing distributions to employees
based on strike time, he cannot treat strike time as a normal absence; thus strikers were
held not to forfeit all of their profit sharing for the year for failure to fulfill the eligi-
bility requirement of having worked 50% of the scheduled work periods during the
qualifying year. Two Board members dissented on the ground that fringe benefits are a
form of deferred earnings based upon the performance of work and that employees for-
feit their contractual rights to fringe benefits if they fail to meet the contractually estab-
lished eligibility requirements because of strike time. Id. at 935. The dissenters noted that
attendance affects profits and an employee who has been absent for more than half of
the scheduled work periods is likely to have detracted from rather than contributed to
the earning of profits. Id.
The Sixth Circuit set aside and denied enforcement of the Board's order in Quality
Castings Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 36 (6th Cir. 1963). Although the case preceded Great
Dane, the court's analysis indicates the outcome had the case arisen after 1967. Whether
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the Board's holdings and characterization of vacation benefits as de-
ferred earnings in General Electric and Mooney Aircraft.67 The only
reasonable explanation for the holdings in General Electric and Moo-
ney Aircraft is that an employer may equate strike time with unexcused
absence.68 Subsequent Board decisions equating strike time with un-
excused absence have cast further doubt on the Frick rationale.69
The second approach adopted by the Board in denying employers
the use of cutoff dates to withhold vacation benefits is that strikers may
fulfill the eligibility date requirement since, even though they are not
actively at work, they retain their status as employees during the strike
under section 2(3) of the NLRA.70 While this rationale clearly solves
the problem when the eligibility provision is worded merely as a cutoff
the employer's conduct is inherently destructive of employee rights or only has a com-
paratively slight effect on employee rights, the 50% attendance forfeiture rule is sup-
ported by a substantial and legitimate business justification. If the employer's conduct
falls into the latter category, a section 8(a)(3) charge cannot be sustained because anti-
union motivation does not exist since the forfeiture rule was applied to strikers and
non-strikers alike. Even if the employer's conduct is inherently destructive of employee
rights, there is no section 8(a)(3) violation since the balance should be struck in favor
of the asserted business justification, because an employer is "entitled to require a minimum
amount of work and consequent profit creation before it permit[s] an employee to par-
ticipate in profit sharing." Id. at 43.
67 Mooney Aircraft. Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1964), enforced, 866 F.2d 809 (5th Cir.
1966); General Elec. Co., 80 N.LR.B. 510 (1948); text accompanying notes 28-33 supra.
68 If a collective bargaining agreement contains a minimum work requirement for
vacation eligibility, it in effect requires absence not to exceed a stipulated length.
Relying on Frick, the Board has also held that an employer violated sections
8(a)(3) and (1) by refusing to grant vacation pay to strikers who were absent on vacation
eligibility dates and "who but for the fact that they were on strike would have received
such pay." Flambeau Plastics Corp., 167 N.L.R.B. 735, 745 (1967), enforced, 401 F.2d
128 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 893 US. 1019 (1969). But the strikers in Mooney Aircraft
would also have received vacation pay but for their strike.
69 In Kimberly-Clark the Board adopted the trial examiner's decision and agreed
with his interpretation of the General Electric holding that "an employer need not re-
munerate strikers for work not performed, means simply that it is no more discriminatory
for an employer to deny compensation for absence due to strike than to deny it for
any other period of absence." 171 N.L.R.B. No. 82, at 14, 69 L.R.R.M. 1408 (May 24,
1968) (trial examiner's decision). A vacation eligibility clause examined in Roegelein
Provision Co., 181 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 73 L.R.R.M. 1396 (March 11, 1970), provided
that employees forfeited all vacation pay if absent for more than 200 hours during the
vacation qualifying year. Counting strike time as unexcused absences, the employer denied
strikers vacation pay for the year because they exceeded the 200-hour limit. Id. at 1-2.
Although the trial examiner relied on the Frick rationale to find a violation of sections
8(a)(3) and (1), the Board reversed his decision, upholding the employer's equation of
strike time with unexcused absences on the grounds that the vacation eligibility clause
was the product of collective bargaining and that during negotiations it was made clear
to the union that strike time would be equated with unexcused absences. Id. at 1-2, 5, 6.
70 Duncan Foundry & Mach. Works, Inc., 176 N.LR.B. No. 31, at 4, 71 L.R RM.
1225 (June 5, 1969), enforced, 435 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1970).
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date, it is of limited usefulness when the clause requires active employ-
ment on the eligibility date. The Sixth Circuit, however, has indicated
that literal application of an eligibility clause requiring active work,
rather than mere employee status, on the qualifying date would be a
violation of sections 8(a)(3) and (1) unless the employer could justify
it in terms of substantial and legitimate business interests.7 ' An em-
ployer would be hard-pressed to advance such business interests be-
cause, unlike other eligibility requirements, vacation eligibility dates
are established primarily for administrative convenience in determining
vacation eligibility and are not related to the performance of work.
Strike dates, as opposed to the length of strikes, have little relation to
employee contributions for purposes of earned benefits such as vaca-
tions.72
In the three arbitration cases considering the effect of a vacation
eligibility date falling within the strike period, the arbitrators agreed
that the contracts in question only required employment status on the
eligibility date rather than actual performance of work.73
CONCLUSION
In General Electric and Mooney Aircraft, the Board adopted a
deferred compensation-earned benefit theory for paid vacations and
held that federal labor law does not require an employer to grant
vacation credit to strikers for the period of the work stoppage. Most
arbitrators have interpreted collective bargaining agreements to reach
the same result. Great Dane generally delineated a set of principles
placing a burden of explanation on employers engaging in discrimina-
tory conduct and specifically held that the withdrawal of accrued vaca-
tion benefits from reinstated strikers must be justified by substantial
and legitimate business reasons. It follows from this that accrued over-
all length of service cannot be withdrawn from reinstated strikers with-
out the employer meeting a severe and perhaps impossible burden of
71 Smith v. Kingsport Press, Inc., 366 F.2d 416, 418 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'g 233 F. Supp.
643 (E.D. Tenn. 1964) (vacation eligibility clause required employees to be on payroll on
certain date).
72 However, an employer should be able to justify an eligibility date requiring the
active performance of work on the basis of substantial and legitimate business interests
(1) if the nature of his business is seasonal, or (2) if the clause was negotiated into the
contract to inhibit strikes at particularly critical times for the employer, such as during
periods of heavy customer demand.
73 H.K. Porter Co., 49 Lab. Arb. 147 (1967) (Calm, Arbitrator); Brynmore Press, Inc.,
8 Lab. Arb. 511 (1947) (Rains, Arbitrator); St. Louis Car Co., 5 Lab. Arb. 572 (1946)
(Wardlaw, Arbitrator).
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explanation. Similarly, the fortuitous circumstance of the vacation
eligibility date falling within the strike period does not result in a
forfeiture of vacation benefits unless an eligibility clause requiring
active work on the qualifying date can be shown to be justified in terms
of substantial and legitimate business interests. Yet an employer should
not be required by law to count strike time in computing overall
length of service to determine eligibility for additional units of paid
vacation.
Ned H. Bassen
